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Nicolai Hartmann and the Transcendental Method
In memoriam Professor Andrzej J. Noras (1960–2020)
Abstract. One of the most often explored, repeatedly interpreted, and rec-
ognized again and again as a valuable achievement of Kant’s philosophy,
is his transcendental philosophy, a new methodological approach that  as
Kant believed  will allow philosophy (metaphysics) to enter upon a secure
path of science. In this paper, I explore Nicolai Hartmann’s reinterpretation
and development of this methodology in both the historical and systematic
context of his thought. First, I will deal with the Neo-Kantian’s under-
standing of the transcendental method as a starting point of Hartmann’s
own understanding of it. Then I will analyze in detail his only paper devoted
entirely to the problem of the method, (Hartmann, 1912), to present how
he understands the necessary development of this methodology. I will claim
that despite the fact that Hartmann  following Kant  never denied that
the real essence of philosophy is the transcendental method, he tried to show
that this methodus philosophandi cannot be reduced to the Neo-Kantian’s
understanding of it. He argued that the core of all true philosophical and
scientific research is the transcendental method, but only insofar as it is
accompanied by two other methods that are needed to complete it: de-
scriptive and dialectical method. I will close by presenting the relations
between these three methods.
Keywords: transcendental method; descriptive method; dialectical method;
Kant; Nicolai Hartmann; neo-Kantianism
Introduction
Nicolai Hartmann (1982–1950), a student of the Marburg Neo-Kantians
Herman Cohen and Paul Natorp, is known as a thinker who wanted
to bring ontology back to the place of philosophia prima. During his
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lifetime, he published a series of ontological works through which he
contributed to the development of every main ontological area. Because
of that, he was called by Herbert Schnädelbach “the most important
renegade of the Marburg Neo-Kantianism” (2000, p. 165) (see also Noras,
2005, p. 221). Since he used the word “phenomenology” to name the first
stage of his ontological method, Hartmann is sometimes recognized as
a representative of the phenomenological movement (Spiegelberg, 1965,
p. 358). But Hartmann himself was rather skeptical about Husserl’s
methodology (Meinong, 1965, pp. 213–214)1; (Spiegelberg, 1965, p. 358).
Furthermore, if we consider that there was no unity of the Marburg
school, because at least from 1912 Natorp started to deviate from Cohen
(Holzhey, 1986; Lembeck, 1994; Noras, 2014), it turns out that Hart-
mann’s ontological program, which is in its very essence nothing else
than categorical and modal analysis, can be treated as a continuation
and development of the Marburg transcendental philosophy (cf. Klein,
1952, p. 106; Noras, 2014, p. 105).
The relation between Hartmann’s ontology and Herman Cohen and
Paul Natorp’s transcendental philosophy is most clearly revealed in the
context of his methodological approach. Hartmann’s ontological method,
which for the first time fully reveals itself in Grundzüge einer Metaphysik
der Erkenntnis (1921), begins to form much earlier, as a result of his
reinterpretation (than a rejection) of the transcendental method  origi-
nating with Kant and as developed by the Neo-Kantians.2 What he was
1 In his letter to Alexius Meinong, Hartmann wrote: “Hinsichtlich der ‘Ideen’
stimme ich Ihnen durchaus zu. Mich hat dieses Buch sehr enttäuscht. In ihm sind
unzählige verdeckte und offene Anlehnungen  ausser an Sie auch an Natorp. Let-
zteres sehr zum Nachteil der Sache.” (Meinong, 1965, pp. 213–214). My translation:
“I totally agree with you about the Ideas. I was very disappointed with this book.
There are countless hidden and open references  to you and also to Natorp. The
latter are very disadvantageous.”
2 Cf. (Morgenstern, 1997, p. 18): “In den Aufsätzen dieser Zeit, besonders in
Systematische Methode (1912) und Systembildung und Idealismus (1912), beginnt
eine vorsichtige Distanzierung vom Marburger Idealismus in methodischen Fragen,
ohne daß jedoch ein offener Bruch erfolgt wäre. So stellt Hartmann der transcen-
dentalen Methode der Neukantianismus die deskriptive Methode der Phänomenologie
und die dialektische Methode Hegels gleichberechtigt zur Seite und versucht ferner zu
zeigen, daß einige zentrale Thesen der Marburger erkenntnistheoretisch neutral sind,
also ‘diesseits’ von Idealismus und Realismus stehen” (Morgenstern, 1997, p. 18).
My translation: “In the essays of this period, particularly in Systematische Methode
(1912) und Systembildung und Idealismus (1912), a careful distancing from Marburg
idealism in methodological questions begins, but without an open break. Hartmann
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rejecting was Marburg’s logical idealism as a metaphysical standpoint,
which developed a purely epistemological reading of Kant. His interpre-
tation of Kant’s “supreme principle” leads him to regard it as a way of
linking subjects and objects of cognition through an ontological network,
one which does not rely on a logical idealist interpretation of the principle
(On this topic see Pietras, 2006, 2011, 2012). Nevertheless, Hartmann
never denied the Neo-Kantian claim that the only proper way to develop
philosophy as a science is projected by Kant’s transcendental method.
Quite the contrary, he considered his ontology as the only proper contin-
uation of the metaphysics initiated by Kant, the metaphysics that will
be able to enter upon a secure path of science. I maintain that during
his philosophical development, he did not reject transcendental method
in favor of any other but only enriched this method by incorporating the
elements of other thinkers’ insights which he valued the most: Nicolai
Lossky, Edmund Husserl, and Georg Wilhelm Hegel (cf. Morgenstern,
1997, p. 18; Brelage, 1965, p. 159). Hartmann’s ontology involved the
sublating (Aufhebung) of the philosophy and methodology of his Neo-
Kantian teachers.3
juxtaposes the transcendental method of neo-Kantianism with the descriptive method
of phenomenology and the dialectical method of Hegel, considered as equally valid,
and also tries to show that some of the Marburger’s main theses are epistemologically
neutral, that is, that they stand ’this side’ of idealism and realism.”
See also (Klein, 1952, p. 106): “Hartmanns Ontologie stellt nichts anderes und
nicht weniger das als den Versuch einer partialen, weil nur so möglichen Durch-
führung des von P. Natorp immer wieder ausgesprochenen Programms der Katego-
rialen Grundlegung aller Philosophie” (Klein, 1952, p. 106). My translation: “Hart-
mann’s ontology represents nothing more and nothing less than an attempt at a
partial (because this is the only possible way to do this) implementation of the pro-
gram of the categorical foundation of all philosophy, which was repeatedly announced
by P. Natorp.”
3 Cf. (Hartmann, 2019, pp. 167–168): “The ontological concept of being-in-itself
may thus be described as a return of the ontological perspective from intentio oblique
to intentio recta. That which has been sublated [German das Augehobene – A.P.]
preserves as its own the determination from which it stems, strictly according to the
Hegelian law of ’sublation’ [German Aufhebung – A.P.]. The sublated is not simply
identical with ’being qua being,’ for nothing has been sublated in the latter. It is, in
fact, just the look which ’being qua being’ takes on when our perspective returns from
the reflective to the natural standpoint. Ontological being-in-itself is the Aufhebung of
the reflective stance incorporated in gnoseological being-in-itself” (Hartmann, 2019,
pp. 67–168).
See also (Stallmach, 1982, p. 615): “Hartmann hat mit der Wiedergewinnung der
Ontologie einen Schlußpunkt hinter den Marburger neukantischen Idealismus gesetzt,
4 Alicja Pietras
The Neo-Kantian Transcendental Method
Among Neo-Kantian researchers, it is generally accepted that the main
aim of the Marburg and Southwest Neo-Kantians was not to interpret
the “letter” of Kant’s thought, but rather to continue the philosophical
investigation in the “spirit” of Kant; that “spirit” had to be extended into
other areas not explored by Kant himself (Noras, 2005, p. 213; Makkreel
and Luft, 2010, pp. 1–2; Kühn, 2010, pp. 114–116). The Neo-Kantians
identified this “spirit” of Kant’s philosophy with a method that he used
(Cohen, 1883; Natorp, 1912; Rickert, 1909; Windelband, 1883b). An
example (and at the same time the best expression) of this position is
Natorp’s lecture to the Kant Society in Halle from April 27, 1912, where
he said:
Cohen acknowledged the idea of transcendental method as the core idea
to which everything else in Kant should be related and from which it
should be understood and evaluated.4
(Natorp, 1912, p. 194), my translation
To be in agreement with Kant’s spirit meant for Neo-Kantians to go be-
yond Kant (see (Natop 243); Kühn, 2010, p. 120). The most famous ex-
pression of this thought is Windelband’s dictum: “Understanding Kant
means going beyond him”5 (Windelband, 1883a, p. IV, my translation).
Between the two main schools of Neo-Kantianism there was unanimity
in claiming that Kant’s philosophy requires some corrections.6 One of
the most important issues in Marburg and Southwest methodological
investigations was to define the essence of the transcendental method by
distinguishing it from other methods with which it was often confused
(due to the ambiguity of Kant’s own formulations). Natorp writes:
er hat gnoseologisch den Realismus, einen kritischen Realismus, im Lande Kants neu
begründet” (Stallmach, 1982, p. 615). My translation: “With the recovery of the
ontological approach, Hartmann drew a line behind Marburg neo-Kantian idealism;
he gnoseologically reestablished realism, a critical realism, in the land of Kant.”
4 “Als den Kerngedanken nun, zu dem alles Andere in Kant in Beziehung zu
setzen, von wo aus es zu verstehen und zu bewerten sei, begriff Cohen den Gedanken
der transzendentalen Methode” (Natorp 1912: 194).
5 “Kant verstehen, heißt über ihn hinausgehen” (Windelband, 1883a, p. IV).
6 “[. . . ] über die notwendige Korrekturen an der Lehre Kants unter uns, trotz
mancher Unterschiede der Formulierung im einzelnen, doch eine grosse sachliche
Übereinstimmung obwaltet” (Natorp, 1912, p. 196). My translation: “[. . . ] there
is a great substantive agreement among us about the necessary corrections to Kant’s
doctrine, despite some differences in wording regarding details.”
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The fixed starting point, the immoveable central idea of all our philos-
ophizing is, as was said, the “transcendental method.” We distinguish
it  in accord with the manifold meanings of the term “transcendental”
in Kant’s philosophy  both from the psychological and metaphysical
methods, as well as from a merely logical method in the old, Aristotelian
and Wolffian sense, that is, from the method of modern “logistics”.7
(Natorp, 1912, p. 196), my translation
There are two important issues mentioned in this quote. The first is a
pretty well-known fact that Neo-Kantianism was involved in the opposi-
tion to psychologism in philosophy (and made great achievements in this
area). Windelband distinguished the critical method belonging to phi-
losophy from the genetic method belonging to psychology (Windelband,
1883b), while Rickert distinguished transcendental logic from transcen-
dental psychology (Rickert, 1909). Natorp’s consideration of the objective
and subjective grounding of cognition also deals with this difference be-
tween the philosophical (that is, logical) and psychological aspects of hu-
man knowledge (Natorp, 1887). The second key issue is that the meaning
of what was understood by the term “logic,” as used by Neo-Kantians
at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, is different from
what we understand by it today (what Natorp called “logistics”). It is
because this “logistics,” that is literally “formal logic,” which today a
typical language user would simply name “logic,” was just born at the
beginning of the twentieth century and therefore was not so widespread
as a discipline as it is today. What was understood by “logic” at the time,
especially among the Neo-Kantians, was something else, namely Kant’s
transcendental logic as a doctrine of the principles of pure thinking about
objects. According to Kant,
[Transcendental logic has to do] with the laws of the understanding and
reason, but solely insofar as they relate a priori to objects, and not, as
in the case of general logic, to empirical as well as pure cognitions of
reason without distinction. (Kant, 1998, A57, B 82, pp. 196–197)
Transcendental logic as related to objects can be called material logic
and should be distinguished from formal logic. As related only a priori
7 “Der feste Ausgangspunkt, der unverrückbare Leitgedanke unserer ganzen
Philosophierens ist, wie gesagt, “transzendentale Methode”. Wir unterscheiden sie 
durchaus entsprechend der mehrseitigen Richtung des Terminus “transzendental” bei
Kant selbst  sowohl von der psychologischen wie von der metaphysischen, wie von
einer bloss logischen im alten, Aristotelischen und etwa Wolfischen Sinne, von dem
die moderne “Logistik” ” (Natorp, 1912, p. 196).
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to the objects, however, it should be called pure and is distinguished
from empirical logic.8 For the Neo-Kantians, transcendental method is
strictly related to this logic; it is a method of transcendental logic.
Through their investigations into the boundaries and methodologi-
cal differences between various scientific disciplines, the Neo-Kantians
made significant contributions to the philosophy of science, especially
to the methodology of the sciences and humanities (Windelband, Rick-
ert). Therefore, it is not surprising that almost all of their students,
philosophers like Ernst Cassirer or Nicolai Hartmann, as well as the rep-
resentatives of other sciences, like sociologist Max Weber, showed great
awareness of and caution concerning the methodological specificities of
the individual scientific disciplines.
The essence of the transcendental method, which, according to the
Neo-Kantians, is the only proper philosophical and at the same time sci-
entific method (because they were always interested only in practicing
philosophy as a science (cf. Noras, 2005)), is that the aim of philosophy is
to give a transcendental justification or legitimization (deductio juris) for
the problems considered (Natorp, 1912, p. 244). In other words, the aim
was to demonstrate the basis of the possibility of investigated “facts,”
that is, their lawful basis (Gesetzesgrund), which also meant demon-
strating the unity of the logos (ratio) underlying all creative cultural
activities (Natorp, 1912, p. 245). Natorp writes as follows:
So what do we mean if [. . . ]  with Kant and even stricter than he 
we require “transcendental” reason or justification, the deductio juris
(as Kant says), for every philosophical position (Aufstellung)? This
requirement includes two essential elements. The first one is a
reference to the current, historically demonstrable facts about science,
morality, art, and religion. Philosophy is not able to breathe in the
“airless space” of pure thinking, in which the pure intellect wants to soar
on the wings of ideas [. . . ]. This is the second, decisive requirement of
the transcendental method: to uncover the ground of the “possibility”
and thus the “legitimization” of the fact, that is, to show and to make
8 This seems to be the main reason why, in the further transcendental inves-
tigations which went far beyond the letter of Kant’s philosophy, the concept of the
so-called material a priori appeared. We can find it in Edmund Husserl’s philosophical
investigations (cf. Husserl, 1969; Łaciak, 2003), but it looks to be also directly related
to some of the Neo-Kantians’ investigations. It can be seen especially in Emil Lask’s
project of the logic of philosophy (1923) and also in Heidegger’s investigation on the
relation between intuition and expression, that is, in the process of conceptualization
(Heidegger, 1993).
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clear the lawful basis, the unity of the logos, the ratio of all such creative
acts of culture.9
(Natorp, 1912, pp. 196–197), my translation and my emphasis
The Neo-Kantians claim that the transcendental method was a pro-
cedure which Kant himself used. The only thing they want to change is
to expand the sphere of objects of this kind of justification (legitimiza-
tion). The fact from which Kant started his investigation and which he
tried to legitimize (justify) was the fact of Newtonian physics. According
to this interpretation, Kant takes for granted the validity of Newtonian
physics, or in other words, he treats as a given historical and cultural
fact the scientific usefulness of Newtonian physics. The whole sense of
his critique of pure reason was to theoretically (philosophically) explain
this recognized fact, which means, transcendentally to justify it by un-
covering the ground of its possibility. What the Neo-Kantians want to
do is the same thing for other cultural facts: other scientific theories (es-
pecially for Einstein’s new physics  Ernst Cassirer), other sciences and
humanities (Windelband, Rickert), for philosophy (Rickert, Lask), and
other areas of human culture: myth, language, religion, etc. (Cassirer).
As I mentioned above, in the Marburg and Southwest schools of Neo-
Kantianism the transcendental method was strictly distinguished from
the psychological method. The real transcendental investigation is not a
search and description of the source of cognition. The source of cognition
is the object of the psychological method. In transcendental investiga-
tion one is asking about the basis of the validity (Geltung) of cognition,
about the source of the legitimation of cognition. The Neo-Kantians
reject all interpretations of Kant according to which the investigation of
the conditions of the possibility of our experience of objects means ex-
amining the psychic (mental) process of cognition. According to them,
9 “Was also meinen wir, wenn wir [. . . ],  mit Kant und nur strenger noch als er 
für jene philosophische Aufstellung eine “transzendentale” Begründung oder Rechtfer-
tigung, eine deductio iuris (wie Kant sagt) verlangen? Diese Forderung schliesst ZWEI
WESENTLICHE STÜCKE ein. DAS ERSTE ist die sichere zurückbeziehung auf die
vorliegenden, historischen aufweisbaren Fakta der Wissenschaft, der Sittlichkeit, der
Kunst, der Religion. Denn Philosophie vermöchte nicht zu atmen in dem “luftleeren
Raume” der reinen Gedankens, in dem der blosse Verstand auf den Flügeln der Ideen
sich emporschwingen möchte [. . . ]. Und des nur ist DIE ZWEITE, die entscheidende
Forderung der transzendentalen Methode: zum Faktum den Grund der “Möglichkeit”
und damit den “Rechtsgrund” nachzuweisen, das heisst: eben den Gesetzesgrund, die
Einheit des Logos, der Ratio in all solcher schaffenden Tat der Kultur aufzuzeigen
und zur Reinheit herauszuarbeiten” (Natorp, 1912, pp. 196–197).
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transcendental investigation is not about the mental but about the logi-
cal conditions of possibility. The mental facts investigated by psychology
(by using the psychological method) are also the empirical facts and as
empirical facts, they require their own transcendental legitimization. As
Kant said: “I cannot cognize as an object itself what I must presuppose
in order to cognize an object at all” (Kant, 1998, A 402, p. 442).
The transcendental method does not deal with the question of the
genesis of human judgments but with the question of the validity of
human judgments. The main philosophical question is “quid juris,” not
the question “quid facti.” As Wilhelm Windelband wrote in his article
“Kritische oder genetische methode?”: “the problem of philosophy is the
validity of the axioms” (Windelband, 1883b, p. 108, my translation, my
emphasis). A philosopher is not interested in knowing and understand-
ing the way in which scientists come to acknowledge axioms; that can
be of interest in psychology or sociology of science. A philosopher is
interested in the logical validity of these axioms. He or she asks about
the source of this validity, the way in which we can justify our acknowl-
edgement of these axioms. This and only this is the true meaning of the
transcendental method.
Hartmann and the Method of his New Critical Ontology
Hartmann was never a methodologist. Nor did he write a lot about
method. Hartmann believed that a method of research is something
which we should use and develop in action, by investigating specific
philosophical problems, rather than by considering it separately as a
topic of discussion. According to him, “it is only after its test in action
that reflection upon method makes sense”(Spiegelberg, 1965, p. 375).
In this he follows Hegel, who states in his famous witty remark that
wanting to begin research with methodological or epistemological con-
siderations is like wanting to learn how to swim without stepping into the
water. According to Hartmann (and he claims that this was also true
for Kant10), methodological considerations should take place only as a
reflection after the research on the object. For this reason, to reconstruct
Hartmann’s ontological method one has to first become familiar with his
ontological investigations. His method, which one can consider to be
10 In all Kant’s works methodological considerations are always placed in the end.
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fully independent of his Neo-Kantian teachers’ positions, consisted of
three stages and was nothing else but a result of his reinterpretation and
development of the Neo-Kantian transcendental method, as presented
above (phenomenology, aporetics, and theory). Hartmann never rejected
transcendental method in favor in any other method (for instance phe-
nomenological); he just “sublated” it in Hegel’s meaning of this term
(Aufheben), that is, reformulated it by enriching it with the elements of
other methods which he acknowledged to be valuable.
It is not a coincidence that only one of Hartmann’s papers was en-
tirely devoted to the problem of the method. It was published in 1912 in
the philosophical journal Logos and entitled “Systematische Methode”
(Hartmann, 1912); it shows how he passes from the Neo-Kantian tran-
scendental method to his ontological method. This “systematic method,”
which he presented in this paper (and which consists of the three above
mentioned methods), is nothing other than a method consciously or un-
consciously exploited in each and every piece of philosophical and scien-
tific research, according to Hartmann. In the beginning, he maintains
that:
The following investigation refuses to create and promote a new metho-
dus philosophandi, but rather endorses realizing the importance of the
well-known old ones.11 (Hartmann, 1912, p. 124), my translation
This claim is completely consistent with his previously mentioned claim
that “the presence and functioning of a method is logically prior to the
consciousness of a method”12 (Hartmann, 1912, p. 150). These three
detailed methods, which are parts of the one systematic method (in the
order presented by the author) are the (a) transcendental, (b) descriptive,
and (c) dialectical method.
Therefore, from the very beginning of his career Hartmann placed the
transcendental method among two others, and claimed explicitly that
“the three philosophical methods do not form disjunctive or separable
11 “Die nachstehende Untersuchung will sich somit nicht im entferntesten anheis-
chig machen, eine neue methodus philosophandi zu konstruieren und anzuempfehlen,
sondern vielmehr nur über eine alte, vielbewährte Rechenschaft geben” (Hartmann,
1912, p. 124).
12 “[. . . ] das Vorhandensein und Funktionieren einer Methode logisch früher ist
als das Methoden bewußtsein [. . . ]” (Hartmann, 1912, p. 150).
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research opportunities but they occur together when they are used”13
(Hartmann, 1912, p. 156, my translation).
The Transcendental Method and its Necessary
Complementary Descriptive Method
The first method analyzed by Hartmann in the essay mentioned is the
transcendental method. One can find there the most accurate and at
the same time most concise definition of the transcendental method for-
mulated in the tradition of German transcendental philosophy:
the transcendental method is the procedure according to which, begin-
ning from the reality of an object, one can infer the conditions of its
possibility14 (Hartmann, 1912, p. 125, my translation)
According to this formulation, the essence of the transcendental method
is that one begins with some given fact (phenomenon) and searches
for the conditions of its possibility. In other words, the transcendental
method consists in moving from what is conditioned to its conditions,
from fact to principle. In that regard, it is based on reductive inference
and can be called reductive reasoning (see Figure 1).
According to Hartmann, this method is as old as philosophy it-
self. Its actual name came from Kant and the Neo-Kantians, who not
only formulated it but also problematized its essence. Nevertheless, we
need to recognize, together with Hartmann, that this method was used
from the very beginning of philosophy. The transcendental method is
“in essence the method of every instituting of principles (Prinzipien-
setzens)”15 (Hartmann, 1912, p. 125, my translation). The ancient
Greeks were using it while searching for the arche of all things.
It has already been revealed that this method cannot be the begin-
ning of any research. If indeed it consists of searching for the principles
(the conditions of possibility) of facts that are given, then it must be
13 “[. . . ] die drei philosophischen Methoden keine getrennten, oder doch trenn-
baren Möglichkeiten der Forschung bilden, sondern durchaus nur einheitlich miteinan-
der in Funktion treten können” (Hartmann, 1912, p. 156).
14 “[. . . ] transzendentale Methode ist dann dasjenige Verfahren, nach welchem
man, von der Wirklichkeit des Gegenstandes ausgehend, die Bedingungen seiner
Möglichkeit erschließt” (Hartmann, 1912, p. 125).
15 “[. . . ] sie ist im Grunde die Methode alles Prinzipiensetzens [. . . ]” (Hartmann,
1912, p. 125)
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Figure 1.
preceded by the descriptive method, which consists in a description of
what is given. This is why Hartmann often claimed (especially in his on-
tological works when writing about categories) that “the principle itself
appears to be a relational notion”16 (Hartmann, 1912, p. 126, my trans-
lation). That is, the principle exists only insofar as there is an object
(concretum) for which this principle is a foundation. One of Hartmann’s
main ontological laws, the so-called fundamental law of validity (Der
Grundsatz der Geltung), states:
16 “das Prinzip selbst erweist sich als ein Relationsbegriff” (Hartmann, 1912,
p. 126).
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Categories are what they are only as the principles of something; with-
out the corresponding concretum they are nothing, just as it (the con-
cretum) is nothing without them.17
(Hartmann, 1940, p. 418, my translation)
We can, therefore, ask: if the transcendental method is not first in
the genetic order of scientific research, why does Hartmann begin his
methodological analyses with it and not with the descriptive method? It
seems that one important reason is that the transcendental method was
recognized as the essence of philosophy by his Marburg teachers. Hart-
mann begins his philosophical path here: from Marburg Neo-Kantianism
and Kant, that is, from the transcendental method. However, his further
philosophical research leads him to the conclusion that this method is
neither independent nor the first, and must be supplemented by other
methods  initially, by the descriptive method.
Indeed, one does not begin research with the transcendental method.
Considered in the genetic order, this method is rather just the next stage,
coming after the descriptive method. Every science begins its research
first with a description because one has first to capture and describe some
phenomena in order to be able to search for the principles and rules on
which they are founded. The principles discovered by the transcendental
method are only logically prior to objects, they are earlier, but not in
the order of discovery. Therefore, the younger the science is, the more
descriptions and the less general laws and principles it includes. Physics
(that is, mathematically based natural science) includes the highest num-
ber of principles and general laws because it is the oldest of the sciences
(and it is the oldest and the most developed because it concerns the least
complex entities, namely  to borrow an expression from Hartmann’s on-
tology  only single-stratum entities). Biology, which is a much younger
science (because it concerns more complex, two-strata, living entities), is
at an earlier stage of its methodological development. For this reason, it
includes far more factual knowledge (that is, descriptions of the structure
of various types of organisms) than laws and principles themselves.
When considering the history of some science one can often notice
a methodological evolution that is in line with Hartmann’s conception.
For instance: linguistics arose at first as a purely descriptive science:
it involved the description of different languages, their development,
17 “Kategorien sind das, was sie sind, nur als Prinzipen von etwas; sie sind nichts
ohne ihr Concretum, wie dieses nichts ohne sie ist” (Hartmann, 1940, p. 418).
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and comparative studies of different languages. It was only after some
time that the ambition to create generalizations appeared, as well as the
search for some universal rules (and structures) common to all languages.
At the beginning of the 20th century, Ferdinand de Saussure created a
synchronic linguistic program, the aim of which was to discover the uni-
versal laws for all languages. After that, Noam Chomsky, considered a
father of modern linguistics, postulated the idea of universal grammar,
which would contain the laws common for all languages. Both de Saus-
sure and Chomsky’s conceptions display the process of transition from
the research stage dominated by the descriptive method to the research
stage dominated by the transcendental method. This does not mean that
nowadays in linguistics there is no descriptive research conducted, or that
there is no possibility that such descriptive research will again become
dominant. There is no necessity for the dominance of the transcendental
method at some stage of a science’s evolution. What I want to say is
only that the possibility of the transcendental method, and thereby also
of its possible dominance, is founded on the descriptive method. The
descriptive method itself (and its results) is one of the conditions of the
possibility of the transcendental method. This is so because the descrip-
tive method provides the “material” for the transcendental method.
Notwithstanding the genetic priority of the descriptive method, one
can also understand why Hartmann’s teachers, the Marburg Neo-Kan-
tians, considered the transcendental method to be the essence of “sci-
ence.” Firstly, in accordance to Kant’s recommendation, they begin by
analyzing the procedure of the natural sciences18 (especially physics),
which  as the oldest discipline  had already entered a more advanced
phase of methodological development. Secondly, what should not be for-
gotten is that from the very beginning of philosophy, scientific cognition
meant a search for principles, or general laws, for what is unchanging,
common, and universal in the ever-changing phenomenal world. In this
18 There is also a very important issue related to the methodological differ-
ences between the natural sciences and humanities considered and developed in Neo-
Kantianism, especially in Southwestern Neo-Kantianism by such philosophers as Wil-
helm Windelband and Henrich Rickert. There is no place but also no need to provide
a detailed analysis of this issue  this problem has already been discussed in the
literature. I would like only to say, following Rickert’s insight, that it seems that the
transcendental method is always more dominant in the natural sciences focused on
general aspects of reality than in the humanities which are focused on the individual
aspects of reality.
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sense, even if the pure description of phenomena were possible (and as
we will see, according to Hartmann, it is not possible), it is itself not an
essence of the real scientific method. Although the descriptive method
has a genetic priority, it has no logical priority.
However, it is an unquestionable fact that the transcendental method
cannot manage without the complementarity of the descriptive method.
It seems that Natorp, even though he did not say it explicitly, was already
conscious of this fact when he writes that “philosophy is not able to
breathe in the ‘airless space’ of pure thinking” (Natorp, 1912, p. 196).
This can be understood as an obvious consequence of Kant’s dictum that
“thoughts without content are empty” (Kant, 1998, A 51, B 75, p. 193).
But the Neo-Kantians were not very interested in this side of Kant’s
doctrine. For this reason, Hartmann supplemented his understandings
of the transcendental method with some of the insights of other thinkers.
Concepts and Intuitions: Beyond Neo-Kantianism
and Phenomenology
Hartmann’s reformulation of the transcendental method means that he
enriched the Neo-Kantian methodology by using the ideas of other
thinkers. Concerning the problem of the necessity of enriching the
transcendental method by the descriptive method, two thinkers seem
the most important. Those are Edmund Husserl with his idea of phe-
nomenology, and also Hartmann’s first philosophical teacher from the
period of his study in St. Petersburg, Nicolai Lossky19 and his intuition-
ism. Lossky’s influence was not only earlier but also more important.
One of the most important of Hartmann’s epistemological ideas was his
doctrine on the inseparability of concepts and intuitions20, which in re-
lation to the history of German philosophy can be treated as an attempt
to reconcile the seemingly oppositional positions of Neo-Kantians and
phenomenology.
19 In his 1912 paper, Hartmann mentioned both Husserl and Lossky (Hartmann,
1912, p. 136). As Malfred Brelage rightly remarks: “[The question] to what extent
Lossky’s intuitionism influenced Hartmann’s concept of cognition would also require
a separate investigation” (Brelage, 1965, p. 159, my translation). Studies of this prob-
lem have only recently been undertaken by representatives of the Nicolai Hartmann
Society, including Pietras and Tremblay.
20 More about Hartmann’s doctrine on the inseparability of discourse and intu-
ition see (Pietras, 2013).
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It is well known among researchers of the history of German philos-
ophy in the first half of the twentieth-century that one of the most im-
portant points of discussion between Neo-Kantianism and phenomenol-
ogy (in Husserl but then also even more in Heidegger) was the issue of
what takes priority in cognition: thinking or intuition. Each of these
most important philosophical movements of the time understands itself
as a science of the origin of cognition (Kisiel, 1995, p. 3921; see also
Noras, 2018, p. 115–116), but they differ in what was considered the
origin. I argue that this debate is based on a misunderstanding. Both
these schools were looking for the origin of our concepts. I claim that
each was in fact looking for something completely different. The Neo-
Kantians were looking for the origin of the validity (form) of concepts,
while phenomenology was looking for the origin of the content (mat-
ter) of concepts. A good explication of the core of this dispute was
provided in Henrich Rickert’s paper published in 1934 in Kant-Studien,
entitled “Kennen und Erkennen” (Rickert, 1934). Rickert claims there
that intuitionism (the intuitional theory of knowledge) cannot give us
any criterion of truth. The reason for this is that, according to him,
“intuitionism is necessarily connected with the theory of representation
(Abbild-Theorie)” (Rickert, 1934, p. 142). It seems that in his paper
Rickert critiques Heidegger’s position first of all, according to which the
real science of origin should be the hermeneutics of facticity and not  as
follows from Neo-Kantian analyses  the theories of values which would
formulate goals as the ultimate justification for every cultural fact.
Hartmann started his philosophical path in St. Petersburg, where
he had an occasion to attend the dispute between the Russian Neo-
Kantian philosopher Alexander Vvedensky and the Russian intuitionist
Nicolai Lossky. From the very beginning, Hartmann was quite critical of
such a strong Neo-Kantian criticism of phenomenological intuition. His
much more “centered” position in the debate between Neo-Kantians and
phenomenology was not a consequence of the influence of Husserl’s phe-
21 “In 1919, a sharp contrast between neo-Kantianism and phenomenology
was dictated by the very proximity of the schools. Both approaches in particular
lay claim to the venerable ambition of establishing philosophy as the “primal” or
“original” science (Urwissenschaft). Both seek to determine origins und ultimates,
the first and the last things, the underived from which all else is derived, which can
only be “shown” or “pointed out” but not “proven,” thereby inexorably implicating
the original science in a circle, assuming in the beginning what it wishes to find in
the end” (Kisiel, 1995, p. 39).
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nomenology on him but rather of his exposure to Lossky’s intuitionism.
If I am correct in this respect, this new historical interpretation can ex-
plain the well-known fact that Hartmann’s concept of “phenomenology”
is quite distant from the project of the phenomenology of Husserl and
Heidegger. In Hartmann’s methodology, phenomenology means nothing
else than an accurate description of all that is given, in the broadest
sense of the term “given”.22
Although in his works Hartmann referred directly to Husserl’s re-
search, their views of the philosophical method differ fundamentally.
The most important difference concerns the fact that, according to Hart-
mann’ view, a phenomenological description cannot be presupposition-
less (the derivation of all theoretical and conceptual material from pure
descriptions is impossible), precisely because the descriptive method is
intertwined from the very beginning with the transcendental and dialec-
tical methods. Hartmann states: “Each cognition of an object is at
the same time a cognition of a principle”23 (Hartmann, 1912, p. 129).
As pointed out by Rickert, the difference between Kennen and Erkennen
means that every cognition (Erkennen) always includes some recognition
of principles next to the mere apprehension of the phenomenon, and only
that recognition allows one to express the apprehended fact in terms of
a concept. Kennen simply means “the apprehension of something,” but
such a pure apprehension does not yet amount to knowledge or cognition
(Erkennen). Therefore, when describing phenomenology as the first stage
of philosophical method, Hartmann claims that at this stage one has to
consider all available data related to the described phenomena  both
what is given to us here and now, as well as all current folk, philosoph-
ical, and scientific theories and descriptions. This is necessary in order
to complete the material, which will later be compiled and compared
in the second stage of research which Hartmann called aporetics. The
22 Hartmann’s understanding of such terms as “given,” “fact” or “phenomenon”
is one of the broadest in the history of philosophy. What is given to us, and because
of that what should be  as accurately as possible  described in the first  that is
phenomenological  phase of any scientific research, is not only what Husserl or Hei-
degger means by pure phenomenon but also all our folk, philosophical and scientific
images, concepts and theories which can be called our cultural pre-judgments.
23 “[. . . ] alle Gegenstandserkenntnis zugleich Prinzipienerkenntnis ist” (Hart-
mann, 1912, p. 129). It seems to me that in this context the analyses of various
types of knowledge conducted by Hartmann’s first teacher, Nicolai Lossky, should be
considered as one of the important sources of Hartmann’s thought (see Lossky, 1919).
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point is that when describing some philosophical issue at the beginning
one should not engage in the epoché (bracketing, reducing) of all one’s
current knowledge of it, as is postulated by Husserl’s phenomenological
method. On the contrary, one should take care “not to omit anything,”
i.e., not to enclose oneself in one’s theory, science, philosophical system,
or individual life experience. Rather, one must try to collect as much
data from as many sources as possible. Hartmann tells us that precisely
because our knowledge is always limited, which means contextual and
necessarily based on assumptions, the best methodological attitude is to
observe as many contexts as possible. Thus, Hartmann’s phenomenology
as the first stage of philosophical method is something different from
Husserl’s phenomenological description. Their common belief is that
science and philosophy have to start from the description of phenomena
but they completely differ in the way in which they understand those
phenomena and the method of their description.
Published in 1912, Hartmann’s paper on the systematical method
shows that Hartmann was conscious of the inseparable relation between
the transcendental and descriptive methods long before he published his
work on the metaphysics of cognition, which is usually considered as his
break-up with Neo-Kantianism. In doing so, he could have been inspired
by both Lossky and Husserl. Considering the possible influence of Husserl
on Hartmann, however, it should be said that the real inspiration defi-
nitely came not from Husserl’s study of the method but from his study of
categorial intuition. Hartmann’s belief that the transcendental method
cannot take place without a descriptive method follows from his recog-
nition that discursive cognition and intuitive cognition are inseparable.
Hartmann synthetizes the Neo-Kantian recognition that intuitions
without concepts are not (yet) what we mean by cognition or knowledge
(Rickert, 1904, p. 147) with Lossky and Husserl’s insight that without in-
tuitions there can be no concepts. In this manner, Hartmann claims that
he is simply continuing Kant’s analyses of human cognition by extending
(and at the same time generalizing) his doctrine on the two sources of
knowledge from a posteriori cognition (scientific cognition) into a priori
cognition (philosophical cognition). Just as Kant claimed that empiri-
cal scientific cognition (cognition a posteriori) is always a synthesis of
concepts and empirical intuitions, otherwise concepts are empty and
empirical intuitions are blind, so Hartmann claimed that philosophical
cognition (cognition a priori) is always a synthesis of some concepts of
a higher level, which Lask called reflective categories (reflexive Kate-
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gorien) (1923, pp. 137–150), and some form of non-empirical intuition,
which Husserl called categorical intuition (kategoriale Anschauung) (see
Husserl, 1921, pp. 128–163; (Łaciak, 2003, pp. 151–175)), and which
Lossky called intellectual intuition24 (Lossky, 1919, p. 364). To put it
simply, to adequately combine, compare, and contrast our concepts, one
has to grasp their content (matter) first.
Every professor can recognize the difference between a student who
has just memorized a few sentences and utters them without under-
standing them and a student who also understands what he is speaking
about by using the same words. This phenomenon of “understanding”
words is inseparably connected with the ability to “grasp” their content,
and this “grasping” is, according to Hartmann (who follows Lossky and
Husserl), some form of non-empirical intuition. It is Husserl’s categorial
intuition (categorical insight25), which Hartmann named conspective in-
24 However, the term which Lossky used to name this kind of cognition in the
original Russian edition of his book published in 1906 was Umozrenie which should
literally be translated into English as speculation or speculative knowledge (Lossky,
1906, p. 325). In the English edition, authorized by him, it is translated both as
speculative knowledge and as intellectual intuition (Lossky, 1919, p. 364)).
25 The traditional English translation of the German term Anschauung is intu-
ition, but I also add the alternative translation of insight, which I see as a comple-
mentary rather than competitive one because I believe it will help in better grasping
the meaning of this concept. In reference to (Holzhey, 2010) and (Ströker, 1992),
I claim that the term “intuition” should be understood “never otherwise than from
the function of intuition for cognition, namely in its function of fulfilling empty in-
tentions” (Ströker, 1992, p. 42), (cf. Holzhey, 2010, p. 30) and not by classifying it as
sensory cognition contrasted with the intellectual cognition or as receptive cognition
contrasted with spontaneous cognition. On this point, Hartmann was most influ-
enced by Husserl and he criticizes not only the Neo-Kantian but also Kant’s original
view. But the term “insight” is troublesome because it instantly refers to looking
at something by means of the sense of sight. A literal understanding of this term
may be the cause for prematurely rejecting the existence of such a thing as categorial
insight by referring to the argument which states that the content (or sense) of terms
cannot be presented in the form of a picture (real or imagined). One should, however,
bear in mind that  first of all  even the sensual intuition (insight) is not limited to
the intuition corresponding to only one of our senses (namely sight), but analogously
there are other kinds of sensual intuition corresponding to the rest of senses: hearing,
smell, taste, and touch. Second of all, the notion of categorical intuition (insight) is
connected with the statement that aside from these various types of sensual intuition
there must be some type of non-sensual intuitions (non-sensual insight) in which the
sense of words is given to us. Categorical intuition is an insight into the sense of
notions that we use. A good example of such an intellectual insight into the sense
of notions is a situation in which a student is looking at a well-known physical or
Nicolai Hartmann and the transcendental method 19
tuition (1949, p. 519–520), or sometimes also intuitive thinking26. In his
main epistemological work, Gründzuge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis,
he writes:
conspective intuition [. . . ] is the a priori grasping of ideal relations,
dependency, relationships, and oppositions (contradictions) [. . . ]. It
is the epistemic authority that we stubbornly as well as misleadingly
glorify and call “pure thinking”  a term that does not at all reflect the
transcendence implied in the act of ideal cognition.27
(Hartmann, 1949, p. 519, my translation)
It is probable that Fichte had this kind of non-empirical intuition in
mind when he wrote about Sinn über Sinn (cf. Siemek, 2011, p. 153) as
something that every philosopher must be equipped with.28 But what
is most important in this context is that Hartmann is convinced that:
Every step of inference in thinking, every step of deduction, is intuitive
in itself, is an insight in the strict sense of the word. The whole logic of
thinking can be understood as a doctrine of laws of indirect intuition
(insights).29 (Hartmann, 1949, p. 520)
This recognition led Hartmann to postulate the necessity of synthesizing
the Neo-Kantian method of pure thinking with Husserl’s and Heideg-
mathematical formula and suddenly experiences a kind of “revelation”: “Ah, that’s
it.” It is precisely this insight into the sense of the formula, the grasping its overall
meaning, which allows one to use it correctly in the future.
26 In his letter to Heinz Heimsoeth (from 8.8.1912) Hartmann writes: “Mir ist
zehn Jahren von meinen ersten philosophischen Lehrern in Rußland eingepaukt wor-
den, daß es “intuitives und diskursives Denken” giebt” (1978, p. 127). My translation:
“My first philosophical teacher in Russia taught me ten years ago that there is ‘intu-
itive and discursive thinking.”
27 “Konspektiven Intuition [. . . ] ist das apriorische Erfassen der idealen Relatio-
nen, Abhängingkeit, Zusammenhänge und Gegensätzlichkeiten (Widersprüche) [. . . ].
Es ist diejenige Erkenntnisinstanz, die man ebenso hartnäcking wie mißverständlich
als das “reine Denken” bezeichnet und verherrlicht hat  ein Terminus, in dem die
durchaus mit gemeinte Transzendenz des idealen Erkenntnisaktes keineswegs zu ihrem
Recht kommt” (Hartmann, 1949, p. 519).
28 Not without significance is the fact that Fichte, and after him (and before
Heidegger) Lask, already came to the conclusion that the final origin of the matter
(content) of all our concepts, and thereby also all our culture, has to be nothing else
than our everyday human life-experiences.
29 “Jeder Schritt des denkenden Schließen, jeder Schritt der Deduktion, ist an sich
intuitiv, ist Einsicht, im strengen Sinne des Wortes. Die ganze Logik des Gedankens
läßt sich auffassen als eine Gesetzlichkeit des vermittelnden Anschauens” (Hartmann,
1949, p. 520).
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ger’s phenomenological method (cf. Pietras, 2013), and he considered
his ontological methodology to be an attempt to realize this task.
The Meaning of the Dialectical Method
This is not the end of Hartmann’s enrichment of the Neo-Kantian tran-
scendental method. The 1912 article reveals that Hartmann’s method-
ological position from the very beginning was inspired by many historical
sources. One of them is the idea of the dialectical method, which is as old
as philosophy but which was renewed in modern times by the German
Idealists, especially Hegel. In his paper on the systematic method, Hart-
mann argues that neither the transcendental method nor the descriptive
method can work without the dialectical method.
According to Hartmann, the dialectical method is a method that one
uses when analyzing the relation between principles (that is, concepts).
If we revisit our Figure 1, we can assert that:
(a) the transcendental method is the method of transition from a
given object (fact, phenomenon) to a principle,
(b) the descriptive method is a method used at the level of an object
(fact, phenomenon) in order to provide its description as a matter
for the transcendental method, and
(c) the dialectical method is a method used at the level of principles
themselves: it is a method of searching, analyzing, and describing
the relationships within the system of principles (that is, among
concepts themselves) (see Figure 2).
At this point, we have to remember an important fact already empha-
sized in the literature (see Noras, 1999, p. 69), namely that Hartmann
never denied that philosophy searches for a system. The idea of a sys-
tem is something that must necessarily accompany all philosophy and
science. Of course, Hartmann is also known for his critique of every
form of _ism, by which he understands all kinds of reified systems (like
naturalism, biologism, psychologism, sociologism, pantheism, idealism,
etc.). But it does not mean that he denies that a system is the aim of
our research. He is not against the idea of a system in general. What he
is against is constructing a system before examining relevant phenom-
ena. As a matter of fact, in every study, the dialectical method always
accompanies the use of the transcendental and descriptive methods.
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Figure 2.
A good example illustrating this realization would be an analysis of
the theoretical beginnings of sociology as an independent discipline. To
describe social phenomena, the first sociologists used concepts, terms,
and principles from other sciences, for instance from biology. Comte,
Spencer, and Durkheim’s comparison of societies and living organisms
was an inexhaustible source of inspiration for early sociological studies.
Through their knowledge of the order of principles developed within
the natural sciences (especially biology), they were able to construct
hypotheses regarding the principles ordering social facts. Indeed, ev-
ery “fledgling” scientific discipline presents its hypotheses in such a way
that the postulated principles are treated as a complement to some pre-
viously constructed system of principles. We can accept this as long as
one treats these principles postulated in the beginning (taken from the
current system) only as preliminary hypotheses and not as definitive and
uncorrectable theories. Hartmann states:
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It should not be disconcerting that the dialectical nature of fundamental
interconnections extends to the descriptive givenness of an object. The
object, in all its indeterminacy, presupposes the a priori of principles
just as much as does all scientific content.30
(Hartmann, 1912, p. 157, my translation)
In other words, it means that when we encounter something that is
given to us (kennen) but not yet known (not yet determined and defined)
(noch nich erkennt31), we first anticipate its properties  we expect it to
have some specific features and behave in some specific manner  because
these properties and behavior match with a specific system of principles
(a priori) which we use because we created it and accepted it earlier
based on some different phenomena previously given. This happens,
for example, when we transfer the laws discovered by more advanced
disciplines (e.g., biology, chemistry, and physics) into younger, emerging
disciplines (e.g., psychology, sociology). It is obvious that further de-
velopment of these scientific disciplines leads to the correcting of these
laws but only as far as the descriptive method provides an increasing
number of descriptions of examined facts. The reason for this is that an
emergence of a new scientific discipline is always caused by discovering
a new region of being (a new region of objects, entities) which we try to
describe first by using initially quite “provisional” concepts, often taken
from other existing and previously developed disciplines, to establish (by
utilizing the transcendental method) their own principles and laws which
would be compatible with the whole system.
Therefore, we have to distinguish between the proper and improper
uses of the dialectical method. Improper uses of the dialectical method,
of which Kant already warned, occur when one applies it without the as-
sistance of the other two methods, namely the descriptive and transcen-
dental methods. This is the point of Hartmann’s critique of philosophical
systems (so-called _isms). Hartmann claims that this is a common mis-
take when someone who discovers some principles which are valid within
one sphere of being (for instance, organic beings, as described by biol-
30 “So darf es nicht befremden, daß der dialektische Charakter der Fundamen-
talzusammenhänge sich bis in die deskriptive Gegebenheit des Gegenstandes hinab
erstreckt. Dieser Gegenstand, in aller seiner Unbestimmtheit, setzt eben doch genau
so gut wie aller wissenschaftliche Inhalt, das a priori der Prinzipien voraus [. . . ]”
(Hartmann, 1912, p. 157).
31 The distinction between “being given” and “knowing” is based on the Neo-
Kantian distinction between Kennen and Erkennen (Rickert, 1934).
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ogy) transfers these principles into another sphere of being (for instance,
socio-cultural being, as described by sociology) and treats them as final
and uncorrectable rather than as merely provisional and temporary (see
Hartmann, 1953, pp. 56–59). The attempt to apply the principles discov-
ered in one region to another region is not a mistake in itself, because it
is what we do by using the dialectical method. One can, of course, relate
this to the widespread regulative idea of “the unity of nature.” The real
source of the mistake consists in a lack of examination of the validity of
these principles within this particular sphere of being. Hartmann states:
It is necessary to proceed cautiously. In general, the sphere of appli-
cability cannot be limited for all categories to that stratum in whose
territory they were discovered and where they stand most clearly re-
vealed in actual structures. There is also a genuine ontic overlapping
of strata. This overlapping is not arbitrary; it is determined by very
definite relations between the strata [. . . ]. It is impossible to tell at
first sight whether a category discovered in a certain field is limited to
this field or whether it reaches into the neighboring strata. In every
particular case, this requires a special examination
(Hartmann, 1953, p. 58)
This necessary examination of the validity of certain principles (trans-
ferred by using the dialectical method from other fields) for a particular
field requires using both descriptive and transcendental methods. The
dialectically derived system of principles must be constantly corrected
as far as new descriptions of facts appear. When the data collected in
the first stage of the method (which Hartmann latter calls phenomenol-
ogy instead of descriptive method) contradicts the previously sketched
theory, then such incompatibility should be analyzed in the second stage
of the method, in aporetics. We cannot deny the existence of these
newly discovered phenomena just because they are not compatible with
our previously constructed system (theory). However, this does not
change the fact that every “fledgling” science must first draw its con-
cepts and principles from some other system. The reason for this is that
Hartmann does not believe in the possibility of pure description, which
means that, just as the dialectical method must always be supported
by the descriptive and transcendental methods, the descriptive method
must always work side by side with the dialectical and transcendental
methods. To create a description, we need concepts. While writing
about the dialectical method, both in the essay being discussed and in
other works, Hartmann often mentions two philosophers in particular:
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Plato and Hegel. Plato described dialectics as a soul’s transition from
assumptions (hypothesis) to the unconditional beginning;32 he claimed
that the dialectical method must necessarily supplement the axiomatic
method because our assumptions (hypotheses) require constant verifica-
tion. Dialectics is, therefore, moving up and down among the principles
(see Plato, 1968, 511bc). Concerning Hegel, Hartmann considers as the
most valuable element of his thought not so much his description of how
the dialectical method works (including the famous scheme: thesis, an-
tithesis, synthesis), but rather his descriptions of many real dialectical
processes occurring within objective spirit. In the article, “Hegel und
das Problem der Realdialektik,” Hartmann states:
Dialectic is clearly rooted in the philosophy of spirit [Geistesphiloso-
phie]. Here it grows out of its relation to the object, indeed out of its
own objective structure. We must therefore look at this region [Gebiet]
of objects, if we want to do justice to it. Here it has to show for itself
achievements that have nothing to do with the metaphysical presuppo-
sitions of Rational Idealism [Vernunft-Idealismus].33
(Hartmann 1935, p. 324, translated by Frederic Tremblay)
Therefore, Hegel’s philosophy appears to be valuable because it re-
veals that the sphere of spiritual being (culture)  encompassing all hu-
man thinking, cognition, philosophy, and science  is dialectical in its
very essence. As a consequence of this fact the dialectical method always
necessarily34 accompanies the two other methods in all our philosophical
and scientific investigations.
More detailed and advanced analysis of the meaning and procedure
of the dialectical method can be found in Hartmann’s later work Der
Aufbau der realen Welt (1940). In the two final chapters (64 and 65)
he presents two methodological procedures which can be understood as
a development of the dialectical method resulting from his categorical
32 “[A soul] makes its way to a beginning that is free from hypotheses; starting
from hypothesis and without the images used in the other part, by means of forms
themselves it makes its inquiry through them” (Plato, 1968, 510b).
33 “Die Dialektik wurzelt eindeutig in der Geistesphilosophie. Hier wächst sie aus
dem Verhältnis zum Gegenstande, ja aus seiner eigenen objektiven Struktur heraus.
Auf dieses Gebiet muß man hinblicken, wenn man ihr gerecht werden will. Hier hat
sie Errungenschaften aufzuweisen, die mit den metaphysischen Voraussetzungen des
Vernunft-Idealismus nichts zu tun haben” (Hartmann, 1935,p. 324).
34 This is not only a methodological postulate, but a fact occurring in all real
human thinking.
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Figure 3.
analyses presented in the book. These are dialectic (or categorical di-
alectic35) and the layer perspective method. Both are methods used at
the level of principles themselves. For this reason, we can consider them
to be two different versions (two variants) of the dialectical method from
the 1912 paper. The difference between these two procedures is that
whereas the former moves among the principles on a horizontal plane,
the latter moves among principles on a vertical plane (see Figure 3).
Hartmann himself finds them to be two dimensions of conspective insight
(see Hartmann, 1940, pp. 538, 605).
According to Hartmann, dialectic is a procedure in which  on the
basis on categorical laws of coherence  from the knowledge of a sin-
gle category (principle) from a particular layer we can gain some new
knowledge of the structure of all categories determining this particular
ontological layer, or vice versa, from the knowledge of the general cate-
gorical structure of particular layer we can get some new knowledge of
a single category from this layer. In other words, dialectic is presented
35 In this work Hartmann distinguishes two kinds of dialectic: categorical dialectic
(which he considers to be a proper way of using the dialectical method) and speculative
dialectic (which he considers to be an improper way of using the dialectical method)
(Hartmann, 1940, pp. 597–598).
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as a kind of inference taking place in the domain of principles of the
same ontological level. It is moving between principles on a horizontal
plane. The layer perspective method, on the other hand, is a procedure
in which  on the basis of categorical laws of stratification  from the
knowledge of a category (or categories) of one layer we can get some
new knowledge of a category (or categories) of another layer. The layer
perspective methodological procedure is presented as a kind of inference
taking place between principles from different ontological levels. It is
moving between principles on a vertical axis.
Hartmann presents very detailed rules concerning both of these pro-
cedures (Hartmann, 1940, Chapters 64d and 65b, pp. 598–600, 607–609).
But what is crucial for the main thesis of my paper is that he recognized
them to be very fruitful and also the necessary supplements to the ana-
lytical and descriptive methods presented in Chapter 63.
In relation to the procedure of categorical dialectic, he writes:
The mutual interpenetration of analysis and dialectic obviously forms
a systematic structure of methods in which the heterogeneous ways of
working accompany each other and correct one another step by step.
To be exact, it is actually a structure of three methods; for description
plays a role here as well, insofar as its advance always makes possible
the inference new conclusions. In this structure, the analytical method
forms the central interconnection, because dialectic and description do
not meet directly. Rather, they work in parallel. If the description
makes a new inference possible, what is thus inferred creates the basis
for a new conspective dialectical insight; but if the dialectic leads to
new categories, these, in turn, are checked in terms of their compliance
with the description of the concretum.36
(Hartmann, 1940, p. 596, my translation)
36 “Das Ineinandergreifen von Analysis und Dialektik bildet offenbar ein Gefüge
der Methoden, in welchem die heterogenen Arbeitsweisen von Schritt zu Schritt
einander begleiten und berichtigen. Ja, es ist streng genommen ein Gefüge dreier
Methoden; denn auch die Deskription spielt mit hinein, sofern ihr Fortschreiten im-
mer wieder neuen Rückschluß ermöglicht. In diesem Gefüge nimmt die analytische
Methode die verbindende Mitte ein, denn Dialektik und Deskription berühren sich
nicht unmittelbar. Wohl aber arbeiten sie parallel. Hat die Deskription einen neuen
Rückschluß ermöglicht, so ist das von diesem Erschlossene sogleich Basis neuer di-
alektischer Zusammenschau; hat aber Dialektik zu neuen Kategorien hingeführt, so
unterliegen diese wiederum der Kontrolle durch Übereinstimmung mit dem deskriptiv
erfaßten Concretum“ (Hartmann, 1940, p. 596).
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This passage remains in line with Hartmann’s methodological conclu-
sions from 1912. All three methods must work together, but one of them
has a central position as a medium between the other two. What was
changed is only the name of this intermediary methodological procedure.
Now Hartmann calls it analysis instead of transcendental method. But
in its very essence it is still the same procedure which was described as
an inference from the reality of the object (concretum) to the conditions
of its possibility (categories).
The Transcendental Method as the Core
of Philosophy and Science
It follows from what has been said that, while the descriptive method is
the first in the chronological order and the dialectical method is the first
in the logical order, the real core of all science is still the transcendental
method. This method provides the transition from the descriptions of
facts to the principles which are the conditions of their possibility. In
other words, the transcendental method binds these two other methods.
Hartmann writes:
It is the central position and the intermediary function between dialectic
and the description that ensures that the transcendental method takes
precedence in all philosophical ways of thinking, while the other two
[methods] mark the upper and lower limits of all knowledge. That is
why it is not only with necessity, but also justifiably in the foreground
of all philosophical consciousness of method.37
(Hartmann, 1912, p. 163, my translation)
Considering this, we see that Hartmann’s deviation from neo-Kant-
ianism, at least in his methodology, is not as significant as it might seem
at first glance. Of course, in his famous Metaphysics of Cognition (1921),
Hartmann did not speak about the transcendental, descriptive, and di-
alectical methods. There he uses more colloquial forms of expression
and divided the method into three stages: phenomenology, aporetics, and
37 “Die Mittelstellung und die vermittelnde Funktion zwischen Dialektik und
Deskription ist es, die der transzendentalen Methode den Vortritt in aller philosophis-
chen Denkweise sichert, während jene beiden die obere und die untere Grenze aller
Erkennbarkeit markieren. Deswegen auch steht sie nicht nur mit Notwendigkeit, son-
dern auch mit Recht im Vordergrunde alles philosophischen Methodenbewußtseins”
(Hartmann, 1912, p. 163).
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theory. One can also notice that his methodological insight is partially
changing, at least in its expression, during the further development of
his intellectual work. When presenting his methodological reflections at
the end of his later work Der Aufbau der realen Welt (1940), he describes
three methods of ontological work: analysis (which itself consists of two
stages: description and inference), dialectic, and the layer perspective
method. For this reason, it is not so easy to conclude definitively that
his idea of method did not essentially change during his lifetime. But
having in mind his own declaration that the consciousness of the method
comes always at the end, it would be more proper to say that he was
completing, rather than essentially changing, his early description of the
method. Therefore, from the systematical perspective, further research
on the relation between methodological reflection from different periods
of Hartmann’s work would be very valuable. It is hard not to notice
some continuity in all these changes. There is a strict similarity in terms
of content between the descriptive method from 1912, phenomenology
from 1921, and the first stage of analysis (namely the description) from
1940. All these terms refer to the method used at the level of an object
(fact, phenomenon or concretum) in order to provide its description as
a starting point for inference. Every Hartmann scholar will also notice
content similarity between transcendental method from 1912 and the
second stage of analysis (namely the method of hypothetical inference)
from 1940. They are two different names for one and the same procedure
of transition from a given object (concretum) to principles (categories).
The dialectical method from 1912 seems to find its continuation not only
in dialectic but also in the layer perspective method from 1940. Both of
these procedures are used at the level of principles themselves in order
to search, analyze and describe the relations within the whole system
of categories. But there are also some questions and issues which would
need deeper analysis, for instance: what is the relation between aporetics
and dialectical method? Does theory as a last stage of method from 1921
find its equivalent in the methodological reflections from 1912 and 1940?
Can the stage of theory-building be identified with hypothetical analysis
and thus with the transcendental method? The fact that Hartmann does
not consider “methodology” to be a separate philosophical issue makes
these kinds of question very difficult to answer.
However, regardless of all these issues, at all stages of the develop-
ment of Hartmann’s thought the transcendental method (in its meaning
presented in this paper) consistently has a special intermediate position
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between description and dialectic. Therefore, one can conclude that
the very essence of every science  and one has to remember that Hart-
mann, just like his Marburg teachers, always recognizes philosophy as a
science  remains the transcendental method as the method of infinite
searching for ever better theoretical (that is, expressed in some optimal
system of concepts) explanations of the given phenomena. According
to Hartmann, even all modern critique of cognition (even with its main
achievement, the uncovering of the limits of human knowledge), does
not in any way invalidate the effort of searching for an optimal system of
knowledge as a reasonable aim. It only makes us conscious of the infinity
of this process.
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